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Abstract 
Do integrated approaches todesign promote the commercial success of new products? Data from 126 U.S. manufacturers 
were used to test five hypotheses in a structural model of integrated esign approaches which go beyond concurrent 
engineering. New product success was significantly associated with market need understanding which incorporates 
information, significantly, from integrated esign into new product development. Integrated esign was found to be 
significantly associated with early-mover strategy, benchmarking best practices and, to a lesser extent, customized or 
proprietary hardware-software systems. 
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1. Introduction 
The majority of industrial R&D funds are in- 
vested for new product introduction and these invest- 
ments are growing in the U.S. and Japan (Hamilton, 
1993; Wolff, 1994). Between 1988 and 1992, U.S. 
companies ubstantially increased allocations of R& 
D funds to new product development and, to a lesser 
extent, increased technical service (Wolff, 1994). 
There is evidence that R&D investments do pay off 
in the majority of industries, especially in pharma- 
ceuticals, consumer products, chemicals and services 
(Waddock and Graves, 1994), although why some 
firms make more than others on R&D is not well 
known. Firms that derive a greater percentage of 
their sales from products introduced uring the last 
five years are often the industry leaders, and new 
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products have become central to modem competitive 
strategies among firms around the world 
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). 
If timely, new product introduction is so impor- 
tant to manufacturers' success (Schoonhoven et al., 
1990; Souder and Sherman, 1994), what strategies 
and methods make firms good product innovators? 
Some limited empirical evidence suggests that the 
simultaneous engineering of product and process does 
improve design performance in durable goods manu- 
facturing (e.g. Adler, 1989; Ettlie, 1995). But, what 
accounts for these effects? Are "integrated" design 
approaches successful? What determines whether or 
not a firm successfully adopts integrated esign prac- 
tices? These research questions were addressed in 
the study reported here. 
Integrated esign is the coordinated evelopment 
effort in timing and substance of the various disci- 
plines and organizational functions that span the 
life-cycle of new products and services. This life- 
cycle starts with research and development or the 
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invention and capture of new ideas, and ends with 
the recycling or disposal of product remnants. The 
empirical findings of this study of U.S. durable 
goods product innovators indicate that earlier movers 
with proprietary computer-assisted design and manu- 
facturing technology, who also benchmark competi- 
tors and peers, are more likely to adopt integrated 
design practices. It was also found that integrated 
design practices ignificantly and positively impact 
better understanding of market needs, which in turn 
significantly promotes new product commercial suc- 
cess. These new practices go well beyond just the 
formation and use of teams, to include job rotation 
and other substantial organizational changes. 
2. The wellsprings of new product success 
While the notion that differentiated, unique prod- 
uct offerings promote success is empirically substan- 
tiated in the literature (e.g. Urban and Hauser, 1980; 
Urban et al., 1987), we know little about how orga- 
nizations are able to organize to develop products 
that meet customer needs. There is a growing 
widespread issatisfaction i industry with even the 
most recent methods of coordinated product develop- 
ment, such as concurrent or functionally orchestrated 
design (e.g. Clausing, 1994, pp. 19-25; Mackey and 
Carter, 1994). 
In this research it is argued that a set of forces 
that influence finn behavior from the environment 
(e.g. customers, technology supply, competitors) and 
internally (e.g. product strategy), combine to insti- 
gate unique integrating mechanisms. These integrat- 
ing behaviors can be used to promote understanding 
of market needs and enhance the capability to con- 
vert market and product ideas into new products 
ideas that can be acted upon. Once action can be 
taken in timely fashion, the probability of commer- 
cial success is greatly improved. The details of a 
model to describe this process are discussed next. 
SAPPHO study in the United Kingdom which exam- 
ined 58 matched pairs of successful and unsuccessful 
product and process innovations (Freeman, 1974, 
Freeman, 1982), and followed by numerous other 
empirical studies (e.g. Maidique and Zirger, 1984; 
Cooper, 1990), there has been a convergent trend in 
the wisdom and findings concerning the immediate 
predictors and correlates of new product success. 
Knowledge of the market and customer needs - 
usually obtained systematically and directly from 
potential buyers - is at the top of the list of new 
product success factors. Product innovativeness and 
perceived value to customers as well as a balanced 
approach between marketing and R&D also are 
consistent predictors or correlates of new product 
success (e.g. Link, 1987; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 
1991). This suggests the first hypothesis for testing 
and replication. 
Hypothesis 1. Market need understanding is directly 
associated with the commercial success of 
new product launches. 
This hypothesis i  not new. But it is included in 
the model because replication of earlier results will 
increase confidence in the balance of theory being 
tested. In addition, and with only a few notable 
exceptions (e.g. Hise et al., 1989; Barclay and Ben- 
son, 1990; Thamhain, 1990; Barclay, 1992), the 
literature on new product success tells us little about 
how to achieve effective translation of market and 
customer needs into ideas or achieve balance in 
development between what is technically feasible 
and market relevant. Further, the strategic ontext 
(e.g. Burgelman, 1991) of new product and process 
development tends to emphasize having competence 
in all technical functions, such as marketing, R&D 
and production, in place (e.g. Calantone t al., 1993). 
How to effectively use these skills and talents, as 
well as how to set the strategic ontext for successful 
development of new products, is discussed next. 
3. New product performance 
Perhaps the most consistent finding in the new 
product literature is that market need understanding 
promotes commercial success. Beginning with the 
4. New product strategy: The early-mover advan- 
tage 
New product strategy is defined by Cooper (1987) 
as the "master plan that guides the finn's product 
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innovation efforts and links new product develop- 
ment o the corporate plan". One important aspect of 
this strategy is how much emphasis is placed on 
being first to market with a new product (Foster, 
1986), but it has to be truly better than existing 
options (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1991, Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt, 1993). The first documented for- 
mulations of the first to market strategy appeared in 
Ansoff and Stewart (1967) who assumed that a 
"strong R&D program" (p. 81) was necessary to 
support his strategy, which is reinforced by recent 
work (e.g. Rosenberg, 1990; Ali et al., 1993; Brown 
and Karagozoglu, 1993). 
The most comprehensive r cent review on first- 
mover advantage (and disadvantage) appeared in the 
marketing literature by Kerin et al. (1992). With 
respect o technological issues, the authors make the 
following important points in their literature review: 
diversified firms have the benefit of scope eco- 
nomics (quick movement among many products -
sometimes called joint production - in manufactur- 
ing); and that product, as well as process technology, 
learning might account for much of the benefit of 
any first-mover advantage in any given industry (cf. 
Rosenbloom and Cusumano, 1987). The evidence for 
late entrants uffering market share disadvantages for
consumer products eems clear even when controlled 
for differences in marketing effort (Kalyanaram and 
Urban, 1992). Gabszewicz et al. (1992) found that 
brand loyalty does confer considerable first-mover 
advantage, consistent with "hard to follow" results 
(Wernerfelt and Karnani, 1987; Conner, 1988; Tu- 
fano, 1989; Chatterjee and Sugita, 1990). 
If sustained market leadership requires technology 
leadership (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Jelinek and 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Day, 1994), it challenges an 
organization to invest in new technical fields which 
eventually will be complementary (Ettlie et al., 1984; 
Damanpour, 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Al- 
though firm size can be a factor, e.g. larger firms 
seem better able to sustain technology leadership 
(Methe, 1992), smaller firms can often afford to wait 
and stay flexible, imitating the best aspects of proven 
products by quickly following (Wernerfelt and Kar- 
nani, 1987). The merits of early followership, free- 
rider benefits (Crawford, 1992) and breadth of mar- 
ket offerings (Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990) have also 
been debated and studied (Malueg and Schwartz, 
1991; Schewe, 1992; McGahan, 1993; Patterson, 
1993). Further, Robinson et al. (1992) found that 
first movers and early movers (market pioneers) 
differed significantly from later entrants, so the term 
"early movers" was adopted for this research. 
In order to effectively capitalize on an early-mover 
strategy and sustain competitive advantage, an em- 
phasis on coordinated effort will be required. Quick 
response can result from one of three alternative 
mechanisms: peed up of existing task completion; 
job simplification, which removes tasks; and elimina- 
tion of rework before shipping or first production 
(Lippman and Mamer, 1993; Patterson, 1993; Zahra 
and Ellor, 1993). Integrated, coordinated action, es- 
pecially in the new product development cycle, uses 
all three methods. It coordinates product and process 
redesign (Ettlie and Reza, 1992), it reduces informa- 
tion uncertainty and false-starts (Adler, 1989; Gales 
and Boynton, 1992), and it reduces design rework - 
engineering changes that are caused by avoidable 
mistakes that often result from lack of knowledge 
about down-stream implications of design decisions. 
Design rework can account for as much as 40% of 
avoidable design revisions (Gries, 1994). 
Hypothesis 2. Early - mover product development 
strategic intentions are likely to be 
associated with the adoption of integrated 
design approaches. 
This hypothesis represents the essential focus of 
the current research: it is proposed that integrated 
design structures are effective because they capital- 
ize on early-mover strategies as well as coordinate 
information supplied by the various disciplines in- 
volved in new product development. Process tech- 
nologies tend to be purchased and are widely avail- 
able to many industry players (Teece, 1988). There- 
fore, organizations need to provide unique value to 
customers through timely new products at reasonable 
cost. 
5. Enabling technologies 
Whitney (1992) reports that Japanese manufactur- 
ing companies are in serious pursuit of a strategy to 
incorporate proprietary computer-aided esign 
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(CAD), computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) and 
computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) software 
systems as a strategic advantage. The Japanese man- 
ager typically depends less on computers and is more 
dissatisfied with information technology than the 
U.S. manager (Lohr, 1995). Fowler et al. (1993) 
found that there is widespread issatisfaction among 
Japanese manufacturers with available software to 
track work-in-process inventories. This would be 
consistent with the Wernerfelt (1984) resource-based 
theory explanation of Japanese finn behavior - ac- 
quisition of capabilities that are difficult to imitate, 
and the capture of certain key resources preemp- 
tively from competitors. This also explains why 
Japanese firms form long-term alliances with suppli- 
ers (cf. Peteraf, 1993), and integrate marketing and 
R&D effectively (Westney and Sakakibara, 1986; 
Song and Parry, 1992). Further, multiple versions of 
a technology, like rapid protyping (Miller, 1991) are 
often available to further capture synergy effects 
from an existing technology base. The customization 
of exiting computer-assisted software packages and 
hardware in manufacturing would accomplish two 
ends - it would significantly enhance xisting ad- 
ministrative innovations uch as teams for integrat- 
ing purposes, by reducing the need for constant 
face-to-face communications and coordination around 
standards, and it would make it difficult for competi- 
tors to imitate unique integrating practices uch as 
supplier orchestration - both technology and compo- 
nent suppliers. 
The adoption of integrated esign practices and 
proprietary software for computerization are likely to 
go hand-in-hand for successful new-product-launch- 
ing firms. That is, finns that innovate technically, as 
well as structurally, are likely to have a considerable 
competitive dge (Perry, 1990; Susman, 1992). The 
tailoring of software systems can be viewed as an 
important prerequisite o restructuring using simulta- 
neous engineering for new product introduction 
(Whitney, 1992). A few firms have even integrated 
proprietary software and concurrent engineering di- 
rectly through expert systems (Thurston, 1993). That 
is, unless practices and policies evolve that are unique 
or rare, they are unlikely to be of any competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1986). Recent examples include 
the case given by Hague (1994) at Cummins Engine 
Corporation, where CAD and CAM software is cho- 
sen carefully from existing supply sources, but then 
it is integrated with third-party assistance (e.g. uni- 
versity programmers). Cummins' proprietary soft- 
ware is developed to optimize engine performance 
for environmental (fuel economy, pollution control) 
and functional performance. Another example is Ford 
Motor Company's proprietary software support for 
quality function deployment (QFD) (Miller, 1994). 
Each of these examples promotes functional integra- 
tion and unique capability building through learning. 
Hypothesis 3. The development of proprietary , 
customized enabling technologies ( e. g . 
unique CAD) is likely to be significantly 
associated with the adoption of integrated design 
approaches. 
6. Competitive benchmarking 
Competitive pressures force most firms to under- 
stand their rivals. This involves both the performance 
standard comparison and search for new methods. 
Method benchmarking is a way organizations can 
monitor environments for competitive practices and 
this type of information often comes from competi- 
tive performance benchmarking exercises (Camp, 
1989; Ulrich et al., 1989; Walleck et al., 1991; 
Karch, 1992/1993; Main, 1992). Benchmarkers 
search for the best standard in performance and seek 
information on comparative methods to achieve these 
standards (Jacobson and Hillark, 1986). If they can 
adapt hese practices to make them unique and diffi- 
cult to imitate, they are likely to be more successful 
(Barney, 1986). 
McGill and Slocum (1994) include (competitive) 
benchmarking in their model of organizational learn- 
ing: successful finns ultimately change their compet- 
itive environment with this model. Rare examples of 
method benchmarking include Marshall (1991). Mar- 
shall compared selected product development and 
manufacturing practices for the instruments and dis- 
play sections of General Motors' Delco Electronics 
group with a major Japanese automotive supplier in 
the same business. The analysis indicated that Delco 
could save $12 million per year with improved pro- 
cess control, the implementation f process tandards 
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and the use of process-driven design standards (cf. 
Ulrich, 1992). That is, the source of ideas for chang- 
ing design-manufacturing integration method and 
structures can often be adapted from method bench- 
marking or method benchmarking done within over- 
all comparative benchmarking studies. Companies 
are very likely to get ideas for new integrating 
practices as well as other policies and actions from 
these method benchmarking exercises, and control- 
ling this information among just a few partners 
reduces the uncertainty of their use and enhances 
their unique advantage. However, simply copying or 
attempting to copy methods is unlikely to succeed, as 
indicated earlier (Barney, 1986), 
For new product development, Ettlie and Warner 
(1992) report that about half of U.S. durable goods 
companies benchmark on design practices, and these 
same companies say that they believe that integrating 
functions is the key to successful new product launch. 
This is consistent with the hybrid model of au- 
tonomous and induced change supported by Burgel- 
man (1991). 
Hypothesis 4. The use ofbenchmarkingfor methods 
( e. g. organization structure) asdistinctthe 
outcomes ( e. g. sales per employee ) is likely 
to be significantly associated with the 
adoption of integrated design. 
7. Integrated design 
Nevins and Whitney (1989, p. 200) say that the 
only way the conventional, serial approach to design, 
which hampers communication a d coordination, can 
be avoided is to adopt an integrated approach to 
product-process design. The integrated approach al- 
lows manufacturing engineers, designers, purchas- 
ing, etc. the opportunity to work together simultane- 
ously so that the resulting design "would represent 
an interconnected web of decisions" (Nevins and 
Whitney, 1989, p. 200), similar to the Wheelwright 
and Clark (1992, p. 14) notion of "broad expertise 
in critical functions, team responsibility, and inte- 
grated problem solving across functions". Therefore, 
integrated esign is defined as the coordinated e- 
velopment effort in timing and substance of the 
various disciplines and organizational functions that 
span the life-cycle of new products and services. 
There is some case evidence (Adler, 1989; Stalk and 
Hout, 1990; Zurn, 1991; Baker et al., 1993) that 
shows coordinated design effort pays off, but there is 
only limited broad-based empirical evidence indicat- 
ing that the link between product and process tech- 
nologies leads to success (Kim et al., 1992; Susman, 
1992; Ettlie, 1995). 
Eppinger (1991) and others (Eppinger et al., 1990; 
Barkin, 1991) have shown the way to simplifying 
design projects. Eppinger extends earlier work to 
show that complex design projects can be simplified 
by creating a matrix of design structure. This matrix 
is used to show the sequence of technical relation- 
ships among design tasks and can also be used to 
structure teams and subteams in the process and acts 
as an alternative to eliminating the manufacturing 
function or market information from the design pro- 
cess. 
Integrated esign can promote better marketing 
and customer understanding in two important ways. 
First, market needs and capabilities are assessed 
simultaneously, rather than being filtered by gate- 
keepers and representatives of functions to commit- 
tees (Souder and Padmanabhan, 1989). Second, de- 
livered quality (both conformance to specifications 
and satisfaction of customer needs) is potentially 
quite high because aspiration and reality can be 
brought ogether in coordinated evelopment effort. 
In rare but not totally unknown cases, the customer 
and supplier are actually part of the integrated design 
effort (cf. Von Hipple, 1988). 
In summary, integrated esign approaches can 
significantly reduce market information uncertainty 
and task complexity for easier project management 
and product launch. Therefore, it is argued that by 
integrating marketing, R&D and manufacturing, cus- 
tomer needs will be better incorporated into develop- 
ment (Ettlie and Johnson, 1994), which in turn pro- 
motes the commercial success of new products. A 
final hypothesis i offered for testing. 
Hypothesis 5. The use of integrated approaches to 
design is likely to promote the understanding of 
market needs during new product deveh)pment. 
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8. Proposed model 
The hypotheses, taken together, are tested in a 
structural model introduced in Section 10. Overall 
success of new product launches is hypothesized to
be directly associated with market need understand- 
ing, and, in turn, integrated esign. Early-mover 
product development strategy, method benchmark- 
ing, and adoption of proprietary software for CAD- 
CAM-CIM are hypothesized to be associated with 
integrated esign. 
9. Methodology 
A total of 431 eligible, address-screened cover 
letters and questionnaires (Appendix A) were mailed 
to randomly selected firms taken from a Compustat 
tape in August and again in October, 1992 (Sudman, 
1976; Sudman and Bradburn, 1982). Durable goods 
firms were used because they have experienced sig- 
nificant global competition i  the last decade. Fifty 
cases had been eliminated as ineligible (e.g. no 
longer in business, incorrect ape information for 
industry category, etc.) in the telephone screening 
process after mailings. The cover letter was ad- 
dressed to the chief technical officer (CTO) or chief 
executive officer (CEO) of the top R&D performing 
companies (based on size and R&D intensity - 
R&D spent as a percentage of sales) in domestic, 
durable goods manufacturing. The average R&D 
intensity of the sample was 6.8% (sd = 6.7%, n = 
120). This is considerably higher than the all-in- 
dustry average reported by Business Week of 3.7% 
(Auderi et al., 1993), but R&D intensity was not 
significantly correlated with the other measures in 
the study, except hat these tend to be larger firms. 
The pilot-tested questionnaire was divided into 
two major subparts - background or general infor- 
mation and then information regarding the introduc- 
tion of the company's "last major new product", in 
order to avoid selection bias. That is, respondents 
were not allowed to pick any new product ever 
introduced by the firm, which might allow them to 
put a "best foot" forward. 
A total of 126 usable questionnaires were returned 
before the cut-off date of 1 February 1993, for a 
usable response rate of 29%. Since the resulting 29% 
response rate was somewhat below earlier surveys of 
this type (47% in Ettlie et al., 1984, and 35% in 
Ettlie and Warner, 1992), an evaluation of response 
bias was undertaken. There was no significant differ- 
ence (other than expected sample-proportionate in- 
dustry differences) in respondent versus nonrespon- 
dent answers in callbacks to a random sample of two 
dozen firms for the first five questions on the survey. 
These five questions covered respondent title, princi- 
pal products (SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) 
codes), number of employees, percent shipments out 
of the country, and outsourcing percertage (see Ap- 
pendix A). 
In a test of responses by SIC code (population vs. 
sample), SIC codes 20-30 were grouped into one 
category, 31-34 were grouped, 35, 36 and 37 stand 
alone, and 38-39 were grouped for cell size reasons. 
The X 2= 2.26 (p = 0.77) which is not significant. 
The population and sample did not differ in response 
pattern by SIC. In the test of firm size (archival data 
taken from Compact Disclosure), for population as 
compared with sample on number of employees, 
z = 0.84, p = 0.19, n.s. and for firm nonrespondents 
vs. firm respondents, z = 0.98, p = 0.16, n.s. For net 
sales, population vs. sample, z = 1.3, p = 0.09, n.s., 
and for firm nonrespondents v . firm respondents, 
z = 1.08, p = 0.13, n.s. Finally, for net sales increase 
(1988-1992), which is used to validate the depen- 
dent variable, for the population versus the sample, 
z = 0.59, p = 0.72, n.s., and for the nonresponding 
firms vs. responding firms, z = 0.68, p = 0.75, n.s. 
(not significant). Therefore, we concluded that the 
sample and population were not significantly differ- 
ent and that no observable response bias was evident 
in these data. 
To further analyze response bias, and on the 
assumption that late respondents are like nonrespon- 
dents (Johnson et al., 1990), the four questionnaires 
which were returned after the cut-off deadline of 1 
February 1993 were compared with the total sample 
(n = 126) on the first three quantitative questions 
used for other call-back analysis. The results indi- 
cated virtually no difference in average number of 
employees (14,291 vs. 11,040), average exports 
(39.5% vs. 31.6%) and outsourcing percentages 
(45.7% vs. 49.3%). 
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The frequency distribution of respondents by job 
title was as follows: (1) general managers, 53 (42%); 
(2) manager or supervisor, 36 (29%); (3) engineer, 4
(3%); (4) staff, 1 (1%); and (5) missing, 32 (25%). 
Industries represented were as follows: (1) 25% elec- 
trical machinery (SIC 36); (2) 16% instruments (SIC 
38); (3) 16% transportation equipment (SIC 37); (4) 
12% machinery (SIC 35). There was no significant 
difference in the frequency distribution by SIC code 
in the original ist targeted for the survey and propor- 
tion of responses by category (see Appendix A for 
expanded sample characteristics by industry). In all 
cases, "don't know," or "unavailable" responses 
were eliminated from the analysis. Scale develop- 
ment is discussed next. 
9.1. Product det~'elopment strategy: Early movers 
Early-mover strategy was measured using a 
summed scale of eight items with a Cronbach alpha 
of 0.72. Five-point, Likert items were used for seven 
of the question-statements, with strongly agree to 
strongly disagree response formats. Items included 
such statements like "recruit he best qualified tech- 
nical personnel", "first in the industry to introduce 
new products", and "tradition and reputation ... to 
be first with new methods". The remaining items 
were product radicalness statements including "new 
to the world" status, "breakthrough" status and 
"revolutionary" status. The section of the question- 
naire used to investigate product development s rat- 
egy was heavily influenced by earlier survey work 
on new products and process technology (Ettlie et 
al., 1984; Ettlie and Rubenstein, 1987). Higher scores 
on this summed scale indicate early-mover strategic 
intent. 
9.2. Enabling technology: Proprietary development 
The approach taken to measure technology adop- 
tion innovativeness was one used by Mohr (1969) 
and subsequently confirmed by Damanpour (1991) 
and others as the preferred method. This approach 
uses multiple firms with multiple technologies with 
several "states" of adoption. Some were fully using 
the technology, others only aware of the term. One 
section on the questionnaire listed out 19 possible 
technologies and methods that might be used to 
support within-firm cooperation and coordination for 
product development. These technologies were 
adapted from the Society of Manufacturing Engi- 
neers Conference Proceedings at AutoFact, in 
Chicago, 1991. They included "enterprise product 
definition tools," like IGES (initial graphics ex- 
change specification), "quality management tools," 
like ISO 9001, "communication standards," like 
EDI (electronic data interchange), "computing stan- 
dards," like platform independent software, and 
"organizational integration tools," like DFA (design 
for assembly). Proprietary CAD-CAM-CIM tech- 
nologies were taken as the anchor of this scale using 
resource-based theories as the guide, and applied 
work by Whitney (1992) and Ward et al. (1993). A 
seven-item scale emerged from the factor and item 
analysis: the adoption of proprietary CAD-CAM- 
CIM; quality management tools - ISO 9002, ISO 
9003 and ISO 9004; common user interfaces for 
computing standards; communication standards us- 
age for EDI, and DCE (distributed computing envi- 
ronment). The Cronbach alpha for the scale was 0.79 
(average inter-item correlation was 0.36). A summed 
scale was used for causal modeling. 
The response format was designed to allow the 
respondent to indicate whether or not the particular 
technology had been adopted and was based on 
previous urvey work (Ettlie et al., 1984): "not-aware 
(scored 1)", "aware (scored 2) ' ,  "rejected (scored 
3)", "in-process of using (scored 4)", "using 
(scored 5)", and "don't know (counted as missing)". 
The higher the score the technology achieved, the 
more likely the firm really understood the technol- 
ogy and was using it, and was able to adopt it in 
many locations. The merging of technology and 
quality agendas i  obvious in this scale. Perhaps this 
represents the ultimate technology adaptation in 
manufacturing. 
Where these adoption percentages can be vali- 
dated with existing, normed results in similar indus- 
tries, there is remarkable similarity. For example, the 
adoption of IGES technology was undertaken by 42 
of the 126 firms (33%). The U.S. Department of 
Commerce survey of over 35,000 establishments pro- 
jected an adoption rate of 35% for this and related 
electronic data interchange t chnologies in 1988 over 
the next five years (U.S. DOC, 1989). 
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9.3. Competition: Method benchmarking 
In order to find out about method (versus out- 
come) benchmarking (Barkin, 1991), the following 
questions were asked: "Do you benchmark (make 
visits to other firms and gauge their practices be- 
cause of their known good reputation) in design 
approaches?" ( yes"  was scored 1 and "no"  was 
scored 0); and "Which organizations do you think 
are good benchmarks in design approaches?" A total 
of 57 (45%) of the respondents said they bench- 
marked, 68 (54%) said no, and 1 (1%) was missing. 
Answers to the second question were used to vali- 
date the first. That is, if a company benchmarks, 
representatives should be able to name their model 
firm. These results are nearly identical to an earlier 
survey - about half of durable goods firms in the 
U.S. method benchmark for new product develop- 
ment (Ettlie and Warner, 1992). 
Four other items were included on this scale to 
gauge benchmarking process and were based on 
research by Ettlie and Johnson (1994) who found 
that there was a tradeoff between the benefits of 
benchmarking and keeping the voice of the customer 
centered in the new product development. The items 
were: whether or not the firm or business unit had a 
program to upgrade the product development process 
(1 = yes, 0 = no); and whether or not marketing (for 
new product development) is a worthwhile invest- 
ment; how well the marketing contribution is under- 
stood for new product development; and finally, 
whether or not engineering personnel rotate through 
marketing training. These were five-point Likert type 
items and for the latter question, less than 10% of 
these firms agreed or strongly agreed with this type 
of rotation statement. The Cronbach alpha for this 
benchmarking scale was 0.64 (average inter-item 
correlation was 0.28). The standardized item alpha 
was 0.66, for mixed format scales. Although one 
would normally want this reliability measure to be 
above 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978), the current research 
has no precedent, so this reliability level is adequate, 
if appropriate caution is used in generalizations. In 
addition, coefficient alpha essentially measures the 
interrelatedness of items (Cortina, 1993). Since indi- 
vidual items but not this scale have been used before 
(e.g. Ettlie, 1995), it suggests that practices do evolve 
and change over time. The methods used to integrate 
functions or disciplines of today may not be those of 
tommorrow. 
9.4. Integrated esign 
Scale development to measure integrated esign 
builds on earlier work (Zurn, 1991; Ettlie and Reza, 
1992; Susman, 1992; Ettlie, 1995) used to capture 
some aspect of actual behaviors and practices used to 
integrate the design (often research, development and 
engineering) with manufacturing functions. This ef- 
fort resulted in a Cronbach alpha of 0.64. The stan- 
dardized item alpha was 0.65. 
Although higher internal consistency would be 
desirable, this scale had adequate properties for in- 
clusion in the causal model and did not have to be 
corrected for attenuation (Nunnally, 1967, Nunnally, 
1978; Lord and Novick, 1968). Many recent articles 
include scales with Cronbach alpha levels below 
0.70 along with higher reliability scales (e.g. Green- 
wood and Hinings, 1993; Kumar et al., 1993; Ostroff 
and Schmitt, 1993; Pearce, 1993; Lefkowitz, 1994; 
Ohlott et al., 1994). Continued scale development for 
this variable is advised. 
The integrated esign scale included eight items 
from previous scales (e.g. Ettlie and Reza, 1992) 
used to measure design-manufacturing tegration: 
new structures (usually teams) for integration; job 
rotation; permanent transfer or mobility for engineers 
and other technical staff; DFA or DFM (design for 
manufacturing) training; manufacturing sign-off; 
"CAD for product and purchasing are compatible"; 
product development team includes outside members 
(non-engineers...); and new policies or practices in 
order to integrate design and manufacturing. The 
four additional items, taken from elsewhere on the 
survey, asked whether or not firms were using simul- 
taneous engineering for concept development and 
generating ideas (two items), and two additional 
personnel movement i ems involving other functions 
as well as shared databases: "Do design engineers 
and purchasing agents/engineers have the same 
CAD/CAM data base access?" and "Do cost ac- 
countants rotate through other positions (e.g. indus- 
trial engineering)?" 
Response formats for the first eight questions, 
which probe practices, not attitudes, were scored 3 
for "yes" ,  2 for "in process of adopting", 1 for 
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"no" ,  and otherwise missing. Others were scored 
"yes"= 2, "no"= 0, and "don't know" as miss- 
ing. This scale is called the measure of integrated 
design. A summed score was used for structural 
modeling, the higher the score, the more integrated 
practices were used. 
Most rare was the use of job rotation: for account- 
ing, 12 cases (9.5%) and between engineering func- 
tions with only 25 (20%) firms saying they use it. 
This is validated by earlier findings which show this 
practice among the most rare in the U.S. (Ettlie, 
1995). Perhaps this adoption rate is low because in 
U.S. companies this rotation mechanism is typically 
used for entry-level positions. But future investiga- 
tion of that assumption is warranted. 
9.5. Technical success 
Among several outcome questions, three items 
used successfully in earlier surveys (Ettlie and 
Rubenstein, 1987) were included near the end of the 
questionnaire for the purpose of gauging technical 
success: "Was the new product a technical success?" 
(We define technical success as the achievement of 
technical performance r quired in the project specifi- 
cation.) "Was technical success achieved at or very 
near budgeted cost?" and "Was technical success 
achieved during the required time period". The re- 
sponse format for both questions was "yes (scored 
3)", "too soon to tell (scored 2)", "no (scored 1)" 
and "don't know (eliminated as missing)". Item and 
factor analysis produced a three-item scale with 
Cronbach alpha of 0.55, and this measure was conse- 
quently dropped from further analysis. Perhaps a 
sufficient number of new products in durable goods 
are launched before technical success is completely 
achieved. 
9.6. Market need understanding 
Market need understanding was measured with a 
summed, four-item scale constructed as modified 
from Baker and Green (1985) which was originally 
included in the project origins section of the ques- 
tionnaire. "How well defined was the user need 
which this project was intended to fill: at the time 
the project was initiated; late in the life of the 
project" (first two questions). And: "How well de- 
fined was the business purpose of this project: at the 
time the project was initiated; late in the life of the 
project" (last two questions). 
The response format of each scale item was a 
seven-choice numbered response labeled "not de- 
fined" (for the "1"  response), "moderately well 
defined" (for the "4"  choice), and "thoroughly 
defined" (for the "7"  response number). The Cron- 
bach alpha for this summed scale was 0.79 with an 
average inter-item correlation of 0.49. All corrected 
item-total correlations were in excess of 0.55 for 121 
cases. 
9.7. Commercial success 
Commercial success of these new products was 
measured by responses from three items on the 
questionnaire: "Overall, was the new product a com- 
mercial success (met commercial success expecta- 
tion)?" Respondents answered "yes" ,  "too soon to 
tell", "no" ,  or "don't know"; "Which one of the 
following statements best describes the return on 
investment (ROI) for the new product o date (circle 
only one)?": "below total costs", "about equal to 
operating costs", "about equal to total costs", 
"moderately above total costs", "a good multiple of 
investment", and "don't know". The distribution of 
answers for the first question was 72 for "yes"  
(57%); 39 for "too soon to tell" (31%) and 9 for 
"no"  (8.7%), with 4 (3.2%) firms not answering 
(eliminated from the analysis). The third item read 
"Was market share attained by the new product 
above, about the same or below expectations'?" A 
factor and item analysis yielded a three-item scale 
with Cronbach alpha of 0.71. 
The measure of new product commercial success 
was validated in two ways. First, the measure was 
directly validated for construct validity by correlat- 
ing archival measures for sales growth (1988-1992, 
since most of these new products were introduced in 
1990-1991) and the summed (and averaged) scale 
measure of commercial success. The correlation was 
significant and in the predicted irection, with r = 
0.25 (p  < 0.05, two-tailed test). Normative data on 
new product commercial success were used next to 
validate this measure. 
The distribution for commercial success was also 
validated by results from a review of eight indepen- 
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dent empirical studies of product success by Craw- 
ford (1987) which found a 40% new product failure 
rate to be typical (much lower than most people 
generally assume). In addition, two recent estimates 
based on expert opinion and a study of over 11,000 
new products puts the success rate at between 56% 
(44% failures) and 65% (35% failures) which aver- 
aged 60.5% successes (Power et al., 1993). All ten 
estimates of new product introduction failure rate 
converge on the 40% failure rate. These results 
suggest substantially high extemal validity for this 
item. These items were used successfully and with 
high intemal consistency in previous research on 
durable goods new product introduction (Ettlie and 
Rubenstein, 1987). 
10. Results 
Structural model analysis (Hayduk, 1987; Bollen, 
1989) using LISREL 7 was conducted (Fig. 1) and 
the supporting correlation matrix (standardized vari- 
ables) with raw measure descriptive statistics is pre- 
sented in Table 1. Technical success, which had 
insufficient internal consistency, (most likely be- 
cause the measure used was inadequate), was 
dropped. Four of the five hypotheses were supported 
by this causal model. 
As predicted by Hypothesis 1, understanding mar- 
ket needs was significantly associated with commer- 
cial success of new products (y = 0.286, p = < 0.01) 
with significant, explained variance, R 2 = 8.2%. The 
other coefficients were not statistically significant in 
this model, however, early-mover strategy was sig- 
nificantly associated with commercial success in an 
alternative model (not shown). One of the three 
exogenous variable pairs was significantly intercorre- 
lated (Fig. 1). 
The 3~ for early-mover strategy and integrated 
design was 0.236 (p < 0.01) which strongly supports 
Hypothesis 2. Method benchmarking was signifi- 
cantly associated with integrated esign (7 = 0.286, 
p < 0.05, supporting Hypothesis 4. However, propri- 
etary CAD-CAM technically failed to produce a 
significant coefficient using traditional cut-offs (7 = 
0.135, p < 0.10). These three variables (early-mover 
strategy, proprietary CAD, and method benchmark- 
ing) significantly account for 19.3% of the variance 
in integrated esign. 
Integrated esign, in turn, was significantly corre- 
lated (3/= 0.273, p < 0.01) with market need under- 
standing, with an explained variance of 7.4%. This 
result supports Hypothesis 5. That is, integrated e- 
sign practices and market need understanding are 
key elements in the new product development pro- 
cess associated with commercial success in durable 
goods. 
Mean substitution was used for missing data con- 
sistent with recommendations in Roth and Jones 
(1994) as well as earlier works (e.g. Kalton, 1983; 
Gilley and Leone, 1991) and no differences were 
observed in either the multiple correlation coeffi- 
cients, the correlation matrix (shown in brackets in 
Table 1), or the structural model, other than the 
O ~  .286* .807 .926 .918 
Fig. 1. Structural model results. Summary ofgoodness offit tests using LISREL 7.16; X 2 with 7 degrees offreedom =9.84 (p = 0.198); 
AGFI (adjusted goodness offit index) = 0.926; root mean square residual =0.065; * significant a 0.01 level, two-tailed test. 
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Table 1 
Correlation matrix (standardized variable measures), descriptive statistics (Pairwise deletion) [n = 126] a 
43 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Early-mover strategy (0.72) 
(~=26.2;sd=5.5;n= 111) 
(2 = 26.2; sd = 5.5; n = 126) 
2. Proprietary technology - 0.01 [ - 0.01 ] (0.79) 
(.~ = 22.4; sd= 6.1; n= 109) (109) 
(~ = 22,4; sd= 6.1; n = 126) 
3. Method benchmarking 0.16 [0.16] 0.23 b [0.23] (0.64) 
(2 = 12.96; sd = 1.5; n = 123) (110) (106) 
(Tr = 12.96; sd= 1.5; n = 126) 
4. Integrated design 0.28 b [0.28] 0.20 c [0.20] 0.35 b[0.35] (0.64) 
(.~ = 21.3; sd = 2.7; n = 90) (81) (77) (89) 
(2 = 21.3; sd= 2.7; n = 126) 
5. Market need understanding 0.22 b [0.22] -0.01 [-0.01] 0.24 b [0.24] 0.27 b [0.27] (0.79) 
(~= 20.1; sd= 4.2; n= 121) (109) (t05) (118) (87) 
(~ = 20.1; sd= 4.2; n= 126) 
6. Commercial success 0.19 c [0.19] 0.01 [0.01] 0.10 [0.10] 0.18 c [0.18] 0.29 u [0.29] (0.71) 
(~ = 9.03; sd= 1.7; n = 72) (63) (62) (70) (54) (93) 
(.~ = 9.03; sd= 1.7; n = 126) 
Mean substitution coefficients indicated in brackets []. 
p < 0.01. 
c p < 0.05. 
typical increase in explained variances with de- 
creased numbers of observations. The first two equa- 
tions use a minimum sample size of 87 cases. The 
last equation (market need understanding and com- 
mercial success) has been replicated by literally 
thousands of data points in the literature (e.g. Maid- 
ique and Zirger, 1984; Crawford, 1987; Souder, 
1987). The model fits quite well: the X 2 maximum 
likelihood estimate was 9.84 (7 degrees of freedom, 
p = 0.198) which is not significant, as expected. The 
goodness of fit index was 0.975. The adjusted good- 
ness of fit index (AGFI)  was 0.926 (J~Sreskog and 
S6rbom, 1989), as shown in Fig. 1. These results 
indicate very good overall model support. 
Not only does the goodness-of-fit result confirm 
the model, it also can be used to set aside the 
problems normally encountered with smaller sample 
sizes and a resulting smaller X 2 value. In addition, 
many articles have now appeared using smaller sam- 
ples for at least some hypothesis testing (e.g. Cook et 
al., 1991; Cook, 1993; n = 53 and n = 51, respec- 
tively) and maximum likelihood procedures, as were 
used here. So a minimum sample size in this range is 
not necessarily problematic. 
The practical significance of the low explained 
variances is difficult to estimate (Johnson, 1995). A 
five percentage point variance in commercial success 
of a new product might mean the difference in a 
profitable year for an entire firm. Further to this 
point, Abelson (1985) demonstrates and argues that 
" i t  is the process through which variables operate in 
the real world that is important". That is, explana- 
tory factors accumulate in practice and these vari- 
ables are typically underestimated in importance by 
variance explanation. In the new product develop- 
ment process, considerable ffort is typically ex- 
pended toward competitive action. A lot is at stake. 
We know this because most R&D dollars are spent 
on new products (Wolff, 1994). To underestimate the 
impact of these variables in the process would be the 
greater danger when drawing practical conclusions. 
11.  D iscuss ion  
Early-mover product development strategy was 
found to be significantly related to the use of inte- 
grated design approaches (e.g. marketing - R&D - 
production teams) in a structural equation model. 
Integrated esign was also found to be a significant 
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function of benchmarking on the methods of new 
product development asopposed to, or in addition to, 
performance benchmarks and, to a lesser extent, 
dependent upon adoption of proprietary enabling 
technologies of integration (e.g. CIM). Integrated 
design was significantly associated with understand- 
ing market needs which positively impacted the 
commercial success of recent, new, durable goods 
product introductions. 
Although many studies have investigated the mar- 
keting-R&D interface, including a recent project 
using the PIMS data base (Holak et al., 1991), little 
is known about the marketing-production interface. 
The results of this study suggest that marketing and 
manufacturing interact directly in the integrated ap- 
proach to design. Examples from Von Hipple (1982, 
Von Hipple, 1988) of engineers, market research and 
sales personnel visiting customers are a variant on 
this theme. Although teams are important, hey alone 
may not be enough to ensure new product develop- 
ment success. Strategic direction, integrated esign, 
and knowledge of customers and competitors are all 
part of the success equation with new products. 
This is one of the first times, if not the first time, 
that survey-based empirical evidence has been re- 
ported showing the positive effect of design integrat- 
ing practices on market need understanding and new 
product success. Further, the data show how integrat- 
ing practices within durable goods firms are very 
much a function of strategies like first-mover tenden- 
cies, potential idea sources like benchmarking, and, 
to a lesser extent, enabling design-manufacturing 
integrating technology adoption. There was a ten- 
dency for proprietary technologies and quality initia- 
tives (ISO 9002-4) to be associated, which suggests 
an emergent trend of a technology-quality connec- 
tion for future study. Perhaps broad adoption of all 
or most of the available integrating technologies i
giving way to a very selective refinement and adop- 
tion of a select number of available options. 
Another important finding of this research is that 
integrated esign approaches appear to be a docu- 
mented method of strategy implementation for suc- 
cessful early movers, even though results (an alterna- 
tive structure model) show early movement to be 
important in its own right. This might explain, in 
part, why early movers do not always succeed in 
their strategies. Balanced, resource-based approaches 
appear to be the key to new product success (Souder, 
1987). The results here suggest hese practices in- 
crease the ability to satisfy customer wants and 
needs (Ettlie and Johnson, 1994). 
Once mastered, do cooperation-enhancing tech- 
niques of management become less relevant? After 
an organization becomes integrated, is co-location 
and face-to-face interaction less important? Does the 
technology of integration then take over - like the 
shift point in a car? This is only suggested in the 
results, but needs verification. As proprietary soft- 
ware for integration is tailored to a firm's needs, 
more projects can be incorporated into a program 
stream. Projects reinforce each other and organiza- 
tional learning results (Senge, 1990). It would be 
worth finding out if the capacity for learning is 
enhanced by the causal sequence supported by the 
empirical results of this research (Adler, 1992). 
Much of what is described and predicted in total 
by the structural model here amounts to the behavior 
of firms coping with a complex, uncertain manufac- 
turing challenge. But there is more to manufacturing 
than discrete products. What can this model do to 
inform the small batch and process industries? What 
is the equivalent of the integrated esign approach 
for a chemical firm? Is there a service equivalent for 
this model? These are questions for future re- 
searchers. 
The findings concerning the success of early 
movers as mediated by integrated esign also raise 
new questions about the success of time reduction 
strategies (Crawford, 1992). Early movement was 
significantly correlated with new product success, 
but is joined in the structural model by integrated 
design. This suggests that early-mover strategies may 
be a driver to achieve arlier technical success which 
motivates timely integration of functions. Speed, 
without he harnessing effect of direction and organi- 
zational integration, might only provide marginal 
advantage in the sustained success equation. 
Caution should be exercised in generalizing the 
results beyond product industries in durable goods 
and to situations with unique integrating require- 
ments, such as those in globalizing operations. Both 
the integrated esign measure and method bench- 
marking scales had reliabilities measured by Cron- 
bach alpha in the 0.60 to 0.70 range. The integration 
scale, in particular, should probably be freshened to 
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incorporate new practices (e.g. global, electronically 
linked teams). 
1 l. 1. Management implications 
Embedded in the results of this research are some 
important implications for managing the new product 
development process. First, results imply that early- 
mover strategies can have an indirect effect on new 
product success when integrated esign practices are 
in place or if there is a plan to use these practices. 
Early movement has both a direct and indirect posi- 
tive impact on new product success. The attacker's 
advantage might be more sustainable if implemented 
by integrating organizational practices. Along with a 
clear front-runner strategy, method benchmarking can 
significantly help produce some of the ideas needed 
to make these strategies and technologies work to- 
gether if it is understood that imitation alone is 
unlikely to be a sustainable strategy. Yet, there are at 
least three barriers to smooth implementation of 
early-mover strategies: new technology development 
(Schoonhoven et al., 1990), governmental regulation, 
and the required learning curve to adopt new organi- 
zational philosophies. A challenge for smaller firms 
is to be able to emulate these practices with more 
restricted resources. 
Although benchmarking promotes new product 
success by supporting integrated esign opportuni- 
ties, there is an inherent difficulty in attempting to 
benchmark best practices outside a firm. First, lead- 
ers are likely to keep proprietary information a se- 
cret. Second, even if this information were available, 
only a capable firm could implement these ideas, and 
by definition, if one was capable, they would not 
have to engage in external idea sourcing. There are 
other, numerous variants on these themes, including 
idea sourcing with partners, etc., but the resolution to 
this paradox appears to be that external sourcing of 
ideas in the absence of capability building is a 
fruitless exercise. The findings of the current re- 
search support his view. 
With regard to the central concept and underlying 
implied practices that support its delivery, integrated 
design approaches are far from a perfectly under- 
stood idea. For example, it is not just a matter of 
organizing a team for new product development. 
This is a time-phased, time-dependent process, which 
changes with each successive new product introduc- 
tion and this challenges a firm to remain balanced. 
Many firms have still not overcome the status differ- 
ential between engineering and manufacturing. How 
can a balanced, integrated approach be achieved 
under those conditions? Where are the qualified 
voices of manufacturing supposed to be found? How 
should manufacturing management be involved at 
the beginning of projects? These are some of the 
challenging strategic issues and questions for the 
firms represented in the study sample of this research 
and beyond, 
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Appendix A. Survey instrument descriptive statistics 2, product development policies and practices 
A.1. Background, policies and practices 
A.1.1. Company background (to verify some published ata) 
A. Principal products (SIC codes in U.S.) . (See table at end) 
B. Current total number of year-round, full-time employees in the firm ~ = 11,040, sd = 33, 491?, in this business unit ~ = 1493, 
sd = 3024? (to verify published ata) 
C. Percent shipments (business) out of home country. ~ = 32% (sd = 24%) 
D. Please estimate to the nearest five percent the total manufacturing cost represented bypurchased and outside costs (material, purchased 
parts and subcontracts). ~ = 44% (sd = 21%) 
A. 1.2. Product development 
MB = Method Benchmark scale items (also see Section A.2). 
MB A. Does your finn or business unit currently have a program to upgrade the product development process? Yes (88%) No (skip to 
question 3) 
B. What areas does this program cover: (Rank 1 = most important, etc., for all that apply) 37% a. quality 34% b. time to market 
1.6% c. suppliers .___d. plant modernization 8.7% e. other (please name) 
C. What is the current life cycle of your main product(s)? .~ = 7.7 years, sd = 6.9 years. Projected? ~ = 5.9 years, sd = 5.7 years. 
D. How long did it take (concept to market) to introduce your last new product? (years) Goal? ~ = 1 year; sd = 1.3 years. 
E. What percentage of your annual revenues come from products introduced uring the last five years? ~ = 49%, sd = 32% (average 
over last 3 years). 
A.1.3. The product development process 
ID = Integrated Design scale items; also see below. 
A. The product development process has often been depicted as a sequences of stages like that below. 
Product Concept - - ~ Product Plan - - ---* Product Design - - ~ Process Design 
Consider only your last major new product launch that has a track record (no jury out products) when answering the following 
questions. 
Name of the last major new product __ (10  cases missing). Date launched.  
In regards to just the product concept development phase of this product 
B. What percentage of total project duration is devoted to concept development? ~ = 16.7%, sd = 10% 
C. What proportion of total project cost is determined by the concept development phase? ~ = 7.9%, sd = 31% 
D. What percentage of total project duration is devoted to product concept, product plan, and product design? ~ = 52%, sd = 25% 
E. What percentage of total project duration is devoted to process design, prototype production, and testing? ~ = 41%, sd = 21% 
ID F. Is simultaneous or concurrent engineering used for concept development? Yes 69.8% 
ID G. Is simultaneous or concurrent engineering used for generating ideas before concepts are developed? Yes 46.8% 
A.1.4. Product development s rategy 
EM = Early-mover items. 
Most companies have tendencies and practices that characterize the way they view new products. Please indicate whether you agree or 
disagree with the statements below that can be used to characterize your finn's new product development s rategy by circling the 
appropriate response. Circle the appropriate r sponse. 
(SA = strongly agree, a = agree, ? = undecided, d = disagree, SD = strongly disagree) [if SA = 1]. 
2 Only sections for which study items pertain are included. Most items that were multiple choice were recoded for analysis. 
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sd 
A. We are supporting at least one major alliance or joint 
venture arrangement specifically to develop or apply new 
technology to new products. SA a ? d SD 2.2 1.3 
EM B. The first principle in developing new products here is 
"know how to educate your customer". SA a ? d SD 3.6 1.05 
EM C. We are actively engaged in a campaign to recruit he best 
qualified technical personnel available in engineering or 
production. SA a ? d SD 2.5 1.23 
EM D. We always like to be first in the industry to introduce a
new product. SA a ? d SD 2.3 1.19 
E. We advertise 
our new processing 
technology to our 
customers. SA a ? d SD 2.8 1.21 
EM F. We have a long tradition and reputation in our industry of 






G. We are strongly committed to technological forecasting. 
(If yes) please name method used: SA a 
H. Which of the following statements best describes your new product? 
(Circle only one). 
Our firm was first in the world to introduce the product • •. 1 
Our firm was first in the U.S. to introduce the product • • • 2 
Our firm was first in the industry to introduce the product • • - 3 
Our firm was second or third in our industry to introduce the new product. • • 4 
I. At the time of introduction, did this new product incorporate 
technology that was a sign~cant break from past 
knowledge, technology, or practice in the industry? 
(Circle only one.) 
The most significant breakthrough in the industry for many years.  • • 1 
A very significant break with the past, but not the most significant ••. 2 
It represents an improvement on past technology - not a breakthrough • . .  3 
The new product is a modest improvement on current practice • •. 4 
The product is similar to competitors offerings with some different features •• - 5 
The product is the same or almost he same as our competitors • • • 6 
Don't know.  •. 7 
J. On the following scale, bow could you describe the new product? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
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A.1.5. Technologies of integration 
PT = Proprietary Technology scale items. 
During the past two decades many technologies have become available 3 that may or may not be appropriate for your organization's 
integration plans. Please indicate whether your organization is: not aware or not considering the technology listed; aware and is 
considering the technology listed; has considered and rejected the technology; is in the process of installing the technology; or has already 
implemented the technology, and have it in use. 
Please circle the appropriate l tters. Use Don't Know if it is not applicable. 
Enterprise Product Definition Tools 
(1) 
A. IGES (Initial Graphics Exchange Specification) 
B. PDES (Product Definition Exchange Specification) Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 2.9 
Quality Management Tools using the ISO 9000 Standards 
C. ISO 9001 
PT D. ISO9002 
PT E. ISO 9003 
PT F. ISO 9004 
Communication Standards 
PT G. EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) 
H. Paperless Product Development 
PT I. DCE (Distributed Computing Environment) 
Computing Standards 
PT 
J. Platform Independent Software 
K. Interoperability 
L. Common User Interfaces 
(6) Y ad 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.66 1.95 
2.1 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3,6 1.2 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 5.5 1.39 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.4 1.5 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.4 1.49 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-process Using Don't-Know 3.9 1.59 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.4 1.81 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.99 1.79 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.9 1.7 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 4.07 1.87 
Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 4.12 1.49 
3 See CASA Wheel, Association of the Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, MI, and Conference Proceedings, AutoFact 
(SME) 10-14 November 1991, Chicago, IL. 
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Organizational Integration Tools 
M. DFA (Design for Assembly) Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.7 1.68 
N. DFM (Design for Manufacturability) Not-aware Aware Rejected In-process Using Don't-Know 4.10 1.4 
O. DFR (Design for Reusability) Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.18 1.97 
P. DFS (Design for Serviceability) Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.64 1.72 
Q. DFD (Design for Disposability) Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.34 2.06 
PT R. Proprietary CAD-CAM-CIM Software Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 4.24 1.28 
S. QFD (Quality Function Deployment) Not-aware Aware Rejected In-Process Using Don't-Know 3.65 1.79 
A.1.6. Design manufacturing integration 
ID = Integrated Design scale items. 
Please read the following statements which describe activities that may be used to coordinate the design and manufacturing functions. As 
part of your new product launch, please indicate if you use any of the following activities to coordinate the design and manufacturing 
functions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) ~ sd 
ID A. We have people who are trained in DFA or DFM. Yes No In-Process Not Applicable 1.8 0.89 
ID B. A manufacturing representative is required to sign-off on 
design reviews for new products on this system? Yes No In-Process Not Applicable 1.44 0.84 
ID C. CAD for product and purchasing are compatible. Yes No In-Process Not Applicable 1.89 1.08 
ID D. We have a team for product development which includes 
OUTSIDE members (non-engineers forexample, 
marketing). (IF YES) Who (by function) is on 
this team? Yes No In-Process Not Applicable 1.23 0.87 
ID E. We have implemented new policies or practices in 
order to integrate design and manufacturing. 
(IF YES) What are these policies or practices? Yes No In-Process Not Applicable 1.02 0.9 
ID F. We have developed and implemented new structures 
in order to coordinate design and manufacturing. 
(IF YES) What are these structures? Yes No In-Process Not Applicable 1.82 0.89 
ID G. Job rotation between design and manufacturing engineering 
is practised in this firm. Yes No In-Process Not Applicable 1.99 0.69 
ID H. Personnel from design engineering are sometimes moved to 
manufacturing engineering or vice versa. Yes No In-Process Not Applicable 1.99 0.69 
ID Do design engineers and purchasing agents/engineers have 
the same CAD/CAM data base access? Yes No Don't Know 1.5 0.6 
ID Do cost accountants rotate through other positions 
(e.g. industrial engineering)? Yes No Don't Know 1.99 0.4 
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A.2. Origin of the project and realized outcomes and contributions of this new product 
MB = Method Benchmark scale items; MNU = Market Need Understanding items. 
1. Who first suggested that this project (product) be undertaken? Check more than one box if necessary. 
Inside the firm Yes Outside the finn 
• R&D Staff [] 25.8% • Customer 
• R&D first-level supervision [] 7.9 • Government representative 
• R & D middle management [] 14.3 • Vendor/supplier 
• VP of R&D [] 19.8 • University consultant 
• General management [] 24.6 • Private consultant 
• Marketing/distribution/sales [] 46.8 • Technical/professional 
• Production [] 2.4 colleague, but not paid 
• Engineering [] 23.8 consultant 
• Finance [] 1.6 • Other 
• Technical services [] 0.8 __  









MNU 2. How well defined was the user need Not 
which this project was intended to fill: Defined 
MNU At the time the project was initiated 1 2 
MNU Late in the life of the project 1 2 
MNU 3. How well defined was the business 
purpose of this project: 
Moderately Thoroughly 
Well Defined Defined 
3 4 5 6 7 








.~ = 4,3, sd  = 1.5 
= 5.6, sd = 1.2 
MNU At the time the project was initiated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 = 4.7, sd = 1.5 
Late in the life of the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 = 5.6, sd = 1.3 
4. At the time the project was initiated, who was the intended user? Check more than one box if necessary. 
Inside the finn Yes Outside the firm 
• R&D organization [] 4% • An external customer: 
• An organizational unit in the another firm [] 
firm with responsibility for consumer [] 




• Marketing/distribution/sales [] 15.1 
• Production [] 7.9 
• Engineering [] 1.6 
• Finance [] 0 
• Technical services [] 1.6 
• Some other organizational unit not listed above [] 0 
• Other [] 
• Government [] 16.7 
• Vendor/supplier [] 4.0 
(Circle the best answer.) [TS = Technical Success cale items; CS = Commercial Success cale items] 
( 1 ) (2) (3) (Missing) 
TS 1. a. Was the new product a technical success? (We define 
technical success as achievement of technical 
performance r quired in the project specification.) Yes 
TS b. Was technical success achieved at or very near 
budgeted cost? Yes 
TS c. Was technical success achieved uring the required 
time period? Yes 
CS 2. a. Overall, was the new product acommercial success 
(met commercial success expectations)? Yes 
sd 
Too soon to tell No Don't Know 1.19 0.43 
Too soon to tell No Don't Know 1.7 0.91 
Too soon to tell No Don't Know 1.69 0.95 
Too soon to tell No Don't Know 1.5 0.66 
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CS b. Was market share attained by the new product above, about the same as or below expectations? 
(Circle only one.) 2.3 1.45 
Market share above expectations -. • 1 
Market share about same as expectations -. • 2 
Market share below expectations • • • 3 
Too soon to tell . •. 4 
Don' t  know • • • 5 
CS c. Which one of  the fol lowing statements best describes the return on investment (ROD for the new product o 
date? (Circle only one.) 4.88 1.56 
Below total costs • • • l 
About equal to operating costs .  • • 2 
About equal to total costs - • - 3 
Moderately above total costs - • • 4 
A good multiple of  investment.  • - 5 
Too soon to tell • •. 6 
Don' t  know • - • 7 
3. Were " in  process"  measures of  project performance used for this new product? For example: 
a. Number  of  design change requests before fully released to production? (fill in number) ~ = 19.3, sd = 32 
b. Number of  actual design change orders actually made after released to production? (fill in number) .~ = 10.9, sd = 23 
c. Dependence on supplier(s) reduced __  
d. Quality improvements (e.g. Cpk, S igma or scrap & rework?) 
e. Other (Please name) 
MB 4. Do you BENCHMARK (make visits to other firms and gauge their practices 
because of  their known good reputation) in Design Approaches? 
Yes (45%) No (54%) 
5. Which organizations do you think are good benchmarks in design approach? __  
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A.2.1. Marketing 
Please circle the appropriate response regarding marketing's involvement (integration) in the development of the new product in 
question. Circle the appropriate r sponse. (SA = strongly agree, a = agree, ? = undecided,  = disagree, SD = strongly disagree) 
sd 
MB 1. Marketing is a worthwhile investment. SA a ? d SD 4.36 0.60 
MB 2. I understand the contribution marketing makes to the product 
development process. SA a ? d SD 4.15 0.69 
MB 3. Our engineering personnel rotate through marketing training. SA a ? d SD 2.01 0.77 
[other marketing items deleted] 
Please return this questionnaire in the attached envelope, or Fax to 313-763-5688.THANK YOU! 
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